2 min readWarningEBA reporting framework 4.2Updated 10 November 2026

Fraudulent payment transactions cannot be negative (Y 01.01, EBA rule v09198_s)

A warning in the payment fraud return (PSD2 fraud reporting), on template Y 01.01, credit transfers transactions.

The rule in plain words

Fraudulent payment transactions cannot be negative.

EBA checks it for 33 rows, from credit transfers (0010) to unattended terminal for transport or parking fares (Article 12 of the RTS) (0390). And on six sheets: domestic, cross-border within the EEA and cross-border outside the EEA, each split into amount of payments and number of transactions. That makes 198 checks. A failure names the one that failed.

How the Line4 Check report words itShow

The first of its checks, word for word as the report shows it when it fails. The others read the same, with their own column, row or sheet.

Fraudulent payment transactions: Low value (Art.16 RTS), Cross-border within the EEA amount of payments >= 0

What to do if your filing fails it

  1. 01Open the template below and find the cells the rule reads.
  2. 02Look for a value with the wrong sign in these cells, such as an amount entered as a negative number.
  3. 03EBA compares the values exactly here: there is no rounding tolerance.
  4. 04It runs only when your filing indicators mark Y 01.01 as reported.
  5. 05This is a warning. It does not stop the filing on its own, but your authority may ask you to explain it.

The cells it reads

Credit transfers transactions (Y 01.01)

Rows

  • 0010Credit transfers
  • 0020Of which initiated by payment initiation service providers
  • 0030Of which initiated non-electronically
  • 0040Of which Initiated electronically
  • 0050Of which initiated via remote payment channel
  • 0060Of which authenticated via strong customer authentication
  • 0080Issuance of a payment order by the fraudster
  • 0090Modification of a payment order by the fraudster
  • 0100Manipulation of the payer by the fraudster to issue a payment order
  • 0110Of which authenticated via non-strong customer authentication
  • 0130Issuance of a payment order by the fraudster
  • 0140Modification of a payment order by the fraudster
  • 0150Manipulation of the payer by the fraudster to issue a payment order
  • 0170Low value (Art.16 RTS)
  • 0180Payment to self (Art.15 RTS)
  • 0190Trusted beneficiary (Art.13 RTS)
  • 0200Recurring transaction (Art.14 RTS)
  • 0210Use of secure corporate payment processes or protocols (Art. 17 RTS)
  • 0220Transaction risk analysis (Art.18 RTS)
  • 0230Of which initiated via non-remote payment channel
  • 0240Of which authenticated via strong customer authentication
  • 0260Issuance of a payment order by the fraudster
  • 0270Modification of a payment order by the fraudster
  • 0280Manipulation of the payer by the fraudster to issue a payment order
  • 0290Of which authenticated via non-strong customer authentication
  • 0310Issuance of a payment order by the fraudster
  • 0320Modification of a payment order by the fraudster
  • 0330Manipulation of the payer by the fraudster to issue a payment order
  • 0350Payment to self (Art.15 RTS)
  • 0360Trusted beneficiary (Art.13 RTS)
  • 0370Recurring transaction (Art.14 RTS)
  • 0380Contactless low value (Art. 11 RTS)
  • 0390Unattended terminal for transport or parking fares (Art. 12 RTS)

Column

  • 0020Fraudulent payment transactions

Sheets

  • 0010Domestic amount of payments
  • 0020Domestic number of transactions
  • 0030Cross-border within the EEA amount of payments
  • 0040Cross-border within the EEA number of transactions
  • 0050Cross-border outside the EEA amount of payments
  • 0060Cross-border outside the EEA number of transactions

A worked example

The first of its checks, with simple numbers.

What the rule then expects

Low value (Article 16 of the RTS), fraudulent payment transactions must then be at least 0.

0Passes
-100Fails

A file that reports 0 passes. One that reports -100 fails, by 100.

The numbers are illustrative.

Show the rule as writtenShow

EBA's formula, as written out for the first of its checks. Cells are written as {template, row, column, sheet}.

{Y_01.01,r0170,c0020,s0030} >= 0

The next five:

{Y_01.01,r0320,c0020,s0040} >= 0{Y_01.01,r0360,c0020,s0050} >= 0{Y_01.01,r0360,c0020,s0060} >= 0{Y_01.01,r0010,c0020,s0030} >= 0{Y_01.01,r0330,c0020,s0030} >= 0

And 192 more, the same formula for the other cells it covers.

Every PSD2 fraud reporting rule, by template

Checks like this one, run at the point of submission, are the first step to real-time supervision.