2 min readWarningEBA reporting framework 4.2Updated 10 November 2026

Credit transfers initiated remotely without strong customer authentication must equal the sum of its six parts (EBA rule v09129_m)

A warning in the payment fraud return (PSD2 fraud reporting), on template Y 01.01, credit transfers transactions.

The rule in plain words

Credit transfers initiated remotely without strong customer authentication must equal these six added up:

  • Low value (Article 16 of the RTS)
  • Payment to self (Article 15 of the RTS)
  • Trusted beneficiary (Article 13 of the RTS)
  • Recurring transaction (Article 14 of the RTS)
  • Use of secure corporate payment processes or protocols (Article 17 of the RTS)
  • Transaction risk analysis (Article 18 of the RTS)

EBA checks it for two columns: payment transactions and fraudulent payment transactions. And on six sheets: domestic, cross-border within the EEA and cross-border outside the EEA, each split into amount of payments and number of transactions. That makes twelve checks. A failure names the one that failed.

How the Line4 Check report words itShow

The first of its checks, word for word as the report shows it when it fails. The others read the same, with their own column, row or sheet.

Payment transactions: Low value (Art.16 RTS), Cross-border outside the EEA amount of payments + Payment to self (Art.15 RTS), Cross-border outside the EEA amount of payments + Trusted beneficiary (Art.13 RTS), Cross-border outside the EEA amount of payments + Recurring transaction (Art.14 RTS), Cross-border outside the EEA amount of payments + Use of secure corporate payment processes or protocols (Art. 17 RTS), Cross-border outside the EEA amount of payments + Transaction risk analysis (Art.18 RTS), Cross-border outside the EEA amount of payments = Of which authenticated via non-strong customer authentication, Cross-border outside the EEA amount of payments

What to do if your filing fails it

  1. 01Open the template below and find the cells the rule reads.
  2. 02Add up the parts in your file and compare the result with the total.
  3. 03If they differ, a part is missing, a value sits in the wrong cell, or the total is out of date.
  4. 04EBA allows a small rounding difference, worked out from the decimals each value is reported with.
  5. 05It runs only when your filing indicators mark Y 01.01 as reported.
  6. 06This is a warning. It does not stop the filing on its own, but your authority may ask you to explain it.

The cells it reads

Credit transfers transactions (Y 01.01)

Rows

  • 0110Of which authenticated via non-strong customer authentication
  • 0170Low value (Art.16 RTS)
  • 0180Payment to self (Art.15 RTS)
  • 0190Trusted beneficiary (Art.13 RTS)
  • 0200Recurring transaction (Art.14 RTS)
  • 0210Use of secure corporate payment processes or protocols (Art. 17 RTS)
  • 0220Transaction risk analysis (Art.18 RTS)

Columns

  • 0010Payment transactions
  • 0020Fraudulent payment transactions

Sheets

  • 0010Domestic amount of payments
  • 0020Domestic number of transactions
  • 0030Cross-border within the EEA amount of payments
  • 0040Cross-border within the EEA number of transactions
  • 0050Cross-border outside the EEA amount of payments
  • 0060Cross-border outside the EEA number of transactions

A worked example

The first of its checks, with simple numbers.

Illustrative values
Low value (Article 16 of the RTS)1,200
Payment to self (Article 15 of the RTS)800
Trusted beneficiary (Article 13 of the RTS)450
Recurring transaction (Article 14 of the RTS)300
Use of secure corporate payment processes or protocols (Article 17 of the RTS)150
Transaction risk analysis (Article 18 of the RTS)100
Together3,000
What the rule then expects

Credit transfers initiated remotely without strong customer authentication must then be 3,000.

3,000Passes
3,100Fails

A file that reports 3,000 passes. One that reports 3,100 fails, by 100.

The numbers are illustrative, reported to the unit, so the rounding tolerance does not change the result.

Show the rule as writtenShow

EBA's formula, as written out for the first of its checks. Cells are written as {template, row, column, sheet}.

{Y_01.01,r0170,c0010,s0050} + {Y_01.01,r0180,c0010,s0050} + {Y_01.01,r0190,c0010,s0050} + {Y_01.01,r0200,c0010,s0050} + {Y_01.01,r0210,c0010,s0050} + {Y_01.01,r0220,c0010,s0050} = {Y_01.01,r0110,c0010,s0050}

The next five:

{Y_01.01,r0170,c0010,s0040} + {Y_01.01,r0180,c0010,s0040} + {Y_01.01,r0190,c0010,s0040} + {Y_01.01,r0200,c0010,s0040} + {Y_01.01,r0210,c0010,s0040} + {Y_01.01,r0220,c0010,s0040} = {Y_01.01,r0110,c0010,s0040}{Y_01.01,r0170,c0010,s0060} + {Y_01.01,r0180,c0010,s0060} + {Y_01.01,r0190,c0010,s0060} + {Y_01.01,r0200,c0010,s0060} + {Y_01.01,r0210,c0010,s0060} + {Y_01.01,r0220,c0010,s0060} = {Y_01.01,r0110,c0010,s0060}{Y_01.01,r0170,c0010,s0010} + {Y_01.01,r0180,c0010,s0010} + {Y_01.01,r0190,c0010,s0010} + {Y_01.01,r0200,c0010,s0010} + {Y_01.01,r0210,c0010,s0010} + {Y_01.01,r0220,c0010,s0010} = {Y_01.01,r0110,c0010,s0010}{Y_01.01,r0170,c0020,s0030} + {Y_01.01,r0180,c0020,s0030} + {Y_01.01,r0190,c0020,s0030} + {Y_01.01,r0200,c0020,s0030} + {Y_01.01,r0210,c0020,s0030} + {Y_01.01,r0220,c0020,s0030} = {Y_01.01,r0110,c0020,s0030}{Y_01.01,r0170,c0010,s0020} + {Y_01.01,r0180,c0010,s0020} + {Y_01.01,r0190,c0010,s0020} + {Y_01.01,r0200,c0010,s0020} + {Y_01.01,r0210,c0010,s0020} + {Y_01.01,r0220,c0010,s0020} = {Y_01.01,r0110,c0010,s0020}

And 6 more, the same formula for the other cells it covers.

Every PSD2 fraud reporting rule, by template

Checks like this one, run at the point of submission, are the first step to real-time supervision.